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During the First World War the British Red Cross Society (BRCS) served 
as the coordinating body for voluntary medical aid giving in Britain. 
Among the many units which came within its purview was the Friends’ 
Ambulance Unit (FAU), formed by a group of young men whose desire 
to serve their nation in wartime conflicted with their pacifist principles. 
Both the BRCS and the FAU were wracked by ideological conflicts in 
the years which preceded and throughout the war. These struggles over 
voluntarist identity highlight the contested meanings of service and 
conscience in wartime. Through a critical examination of the language 
of official histories and biographies, this article will argue that the war 
formed a key moment in the relationship between the British state and 
voluntary medical aid, with the state’s increasing role in the work of such 
organizations raising questions about the voluntarist principles to which 
aid organizations laid claim. The struggles that both organizations and 
individuals within them faced in reconciling the competing pressures 
that this new relationship created form a legacy of the war which contin-
ues to have important implications for the place of medical voluntarism 
in wartime today.
keywords Friends’ Ambulance Unit, British Red Cross, medical aid, volun-
tarism, First World War
In his 1953 autobiography, The Grace of Forgetting, Geoffrey Winthrop Young, one 
of the founder members of the Friends’ Ambulance Unit (FAU) wrote of a meeting 
he had in London in the early days of the First World War: ‘Philip J. Baker came 
to tell me of the conflict between traditional principles and the call of their country 
which many young Friends (especially at Cambridge) were finding themselves in, 
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and of his intention to form them into a trained ambulance corps for field work’.1 
This passage captures much of the ambiguity at the heart not only of a unit in which 
young men opposed to conflict and combat on ideological grounds could nonetheless 
experience the adventure and excitement associated with the conflict zone and thus 
fulfil their gendered duty to the nation,2 but also of First World War British medi-
cal voluntarism more generally. The history of such voluntary aid in wartime had, 
in Britain, since the middle of the nineteenth century, involved numerous struggles 
between different organizations over the scope of their roles in both war and peace. 
At the heart of these struggles was the conflict between the humanitarian principles 
of neutral medical aid, as envisioned by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross,3 and the practical realities of providing care in the highly partisan context of 
a society of war, when the interests of the military and the nation tended to override 
all other concerns.
This article examines the struggle over the voluntarist identity of both the Red 
Cross, the overarching organization for medical and humanitarian aid in Britain dur-
ing the First World War, and the FAU, a unit within that organization whose debates 
over the role of the medical volunteer in war time highlight the contested meanings of 
ideas of service and conscience. Through a critical examination of the language of offi-
cial histories of both establishments, as well as biographies and autobiographies of key 
members, it will argue that the war formed a key moment in the relationship between 
the British state and voluntary medical aid, with the state’s increasing role in the work 
of such organizations raising questions about the voluntarist principles to which they 
laid claim. The struggles that both organizations and individuals within them faced, to 
reconcile the competing pressures that this new relationship created, form a legacy of 
the war which would have important implications for the place of medical voluntarism 
in Britain throughout the twentieth century. In the context of total war, the need to 
explicitly locate voluntary medical aid in relation to the state helped define social and 
cultural understandings of such aid, understandings which continue to shape the place 
of voluntary medical caregivers in conflict zones to this day.
Medical voluntarism in Britain
The outbreak of war in 1914 united the many groups seeking to provide medical 
aid to soldiers, both those already established and those formed in direct response 
1 G. Winthrop Young, The Grace of Forgetting (London: Country Life Limited, 1953), p. 182. Barker was a 
member of the Society of Friends, or Quakers, and a pacifist.
2 For discussions of the importance of the image of the soldier as combatant in this period, and the gendering of 
the role of the soldier, see N. Gullace, ‘The Blood of Our Sons’: Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British 
Citizenship During the Great War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); M. Paris, Warrior Nation: Images 
of War in British Popular Culture, 1850–2000 (London: Reaktion, 2000), pp. 47–48; J. Horne, ‘Masculinity in 
politics and war in the age of the nation-states and world wars, 1850–1950,’ in Masculinities in Politics and 
War: Gendering Modern History, ed. by S. Dudink, K. Hagemann, and J. Tosh (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2004), pp. 22–40; L. Bibbings, Telling Tales About Men: Conceptions of Conscientious 
Objectors to Military Service During the First World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 
89; G. Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities (London: 
Routledge, 1994), pp. 104–14.
3 C. Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross (London: HarperCollins, 
1998).
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to the declaration of war, under the umbrella of the Joint Committee of the British 
Red Cross and the Order of St John of Jerusalem. Throughout the war, it was this 
committee which negotiated a working relationship with the Army Medical Services 
(AMS) through forms of ‘Red Cross patriotism’,4 which demonstrated the alliance 
of the actions of volunteers with the aims of the military authorities. Nor was it 
only, or even chiefly, the administrative level of voluntary medical aid that was 
forced to integrate with the national military effort during the war. The various 
units on the ground that the Joint Committee represented also had to find accom-
modation with the military services they sought to aid. Such accommodation was 
often problematic, especially as the war went on and military demands for man-
power increased. For units such as the FAU, the questions raised by their choice of 
serving in a non-combatant unit dedicated to care-giving were increasingly inflected 
by assumptions about combatant military service as the most appropriate role for 
men in wartime.
The question of the role of the First World War in defining and redefining the place 
of medical voluntarism in British society must be located within the wider history of 
British philanthropy and voluntarism. While the importance of these impulses and 
movements has been extensively investigated in relation to both Victorian Britain5 
and the development of the welfare state,6 Peter Grant has argued that ‘the signifi-
cance of the period [of the First World War] has hitherto been obscured by perva-
sive misunderstandings regarding the history and development of voluntary action’.7 
Histories of British philanthropy, he suggests, have ignored the period of the First 
World War and its aftermath as an inexplicable moment between a mythic ‘golden 
age’ of philanthropy and the establishment of the welfare state after the Second 
World War. He quotes Geoffrey Finlayson’s argument that ‘studies on the influence 
of war on welfare in the twentieth century […] have concentrated almost exclusively 
on the provision of statutory welfare in Britain to the exclusion of an examination 
of voluntarism’.8
Grant’s own argument focuses on the wartime voluntary effort located within 
Britain which not only supported men at the front, but also provided aid to many 
other domestic causes. He explores the ways in which the war reshaped the relation-
ship between voluntary and state action so that, by 1918, the idea of ‘charity working 
4 J. F. Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).
5 D. Owen, English Philanthropy 1660–1960 (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964); B. 
Harrison, ‘Philanthropy and the Victorians’, Victorian Studies, 9 (1966), 353–74; A. J. Kidd, State, Society and 
the Poor in Nineteenth-Century England (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); P. Mandler, ed., The Uses of Charity: 
The Poor on Relief in the Nineteenth-Century Metropolis (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1990); F. Prochaska, The Voluntary Impulse: Philanthropy in Modern Britain (London: Faber, 1988); J. D. 
Smith, ‘Philanthropy and Self-help in Britain 1500–1945’, in An Introduction to the Voluntary Sector, ed. by J. 
D. Smith, C. Rochester, and R. Hedley (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 9–39.
6 D. Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State: A History of Social Policy since the Industrial Revolution 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1973); J. R. Hay, The Development of the British Welfare State, 1880–1975 
(London: E. Arnold, 1978); P. Thane, The Foundations of the Welfare State, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1996).
7 P. Grant, ‘Voluntarism and the Impact of the First World War,’ in The Ages of Voluntarism: How We Got to 
the Big Society, ed. by M. Hilton and J. McKay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 27.
8 G. Finlayson, ‘A Moving Frontier: Voluntarism and the Sate in British Social Welfare, 1911–1949’, Twentieth 
Century British History, 1 (1990), 183, quoted in Grant, p. 29.
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hand-in-hand with state welfare, had decisively gained the upper hand’.9 This is an 
argument that tends to ignore the place of medical voluntarism in wartime because, 
according to Grant, such organizations ‘were, to some extent, already systematised 
or state-controlled, or quickly became so’.10 Yet, while there was undoubtedly a close 
relationship between the state and what Michael Barnett has termed ‘emergency’ 
humanitarian organizations in Britain in 1914,11 this masked a far more complex and 
contested relationship between the two that stretched back over half a century. It 
was this contestation that the First World War was to resolve in favour of the state’s 
domination of voluntary medical relief.
Central to Barnett’s thesis is the idea that ‘emergency and alchemical humani-
tarianism began with different relationships to the state. […] [T]he [International 
Committee of the Red Cross] ICRC was encroaching on one of the state’s most 
sensitive areas, security, and started as a quasi-public, quasi-private body, an arm of 
states even as it was independent of them. Consequently, from the very beginning the 
ICRC’s very existence and effectiveness depended on states, which meant an acute 
sensitivity to their views’.12 As a result, throughout the nineteenth century, Red Cross 
societies ‘became imprinted by the state system and patriotism. States increasingly 
treated the national Red Cross societies as part of their war effort, and the Red Cross 
societies, desirous of being accepted by their governments, accommodated. Far from 
articulating and aspiring to cosmopolitanism, they developed a patriotic nationalism 
as they reminded citizens of their duty to help the soldier at the front’.13 This is the 
position that John F. Hutchinson, in his critical history of the Red Cross, defines as 
‘Red Cross patriotism’, a ‘selective and distorted realization of [the original found-
ers’] ideas by the national governments of the day’ which held that, while ‘the true 
test of philanthropy had been assisting wounded enemy soldiers, […] now it had 
become helping your own soldiers and those of your allies’.14 Hutchinson identifies 
Japan as being at the forefront of developing ‘a carefully organised Red Cross society 
that serve[d] as a vehicle for rallying the noncombatant population behind the war 
effort’ during the Russo-Japanese war.15
The British Red Cross Society before the First World War
However, these developments were by no means consistent across the world. In 
Britain at this time, the Foreign Office had ‘a very real spirit of wariness […] towards 
the Geneva Convention and the International Committee’.16 This found expression 
9 Grant, p. 46.
10 Ibid., p. 35.
11 M. Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 
76. Barnett contrasts emergency humanitarianism, which tackles the humanitarian crises on the basis of super-
ficial human need, with alchemical humanitarianism, which uses aid more systematically to create space for 
longer-term humanistic change and action within government structures.
12 Barnett, p. 81.
13 Ibid., p. 81.
14 Hutchinson, p. 6.
15 Ibid., p. 202.
16 Moorehead, p. 132.
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in a sense of rivalry between the British military medical service, itself in its formal 
infancy in the late nineteenth century,17 and the British National Aid Society, the 
body set up in 1870 to provide humanitarian aid during the Franco-Prussian War. 
Such was this sense of rivalry that, in 1885, the Army Medical Department rejected 
the Society’s offers of help during the Egyptian campaign. It was not until 1899, dur-
ing the Second Anglo-Boer War, that the War Office convened a separate recognized 
Central British Red Cross Committee with the intent of planning voluntary aid to 
meet the supplementary requirements of the Army Medical Service.
Nor were the divisions only between the armed forces and the National Aid 
Society. There were equally important divisions within the Society itself, princi-
pally over how to use funds donated for the relief of suffering in wartime at the 
end of the conflict. While some members, including Sir John Furley and Sir Henry 
Brackenbury, wanted to use the funds to provide peacetime training for volunteers, 
who would assist at civil and industrial accidents in peace and act as supplementary 
stretcher bearers in war, Robert Loyd-Lindsay, the Society’s chairman and a hero 
of the Crimean War, believed that funds should be left gathering interest for use 
in future conflicts. Furley, along with Sir Edmund Lechmere and Francis Duncan, 
would, in 1887, go on to form the St John Ambulance Association ‘to train men and 
women in First Aid to minister to the sick and wounded in war and for the benefit 
of the civil population in peace’.18 It was Furley, in his role as co-founder of the St 
John Ambulance Association, with its belief in ‘hospitaller work on an extended 
scale […] whether as a civilian reserve for the Army Medical Department or beyond 
that as voluntary aid movement for the benefit of all in time of peace’,19 rather than 
as representative of the National Aid Society, who would lead the representation of 
British voluntary aid associations at the congresses of the International Red Cross 
for the next twenty years.
Although the National Aid Society and the Central British Red Cross Committee 
were forcibly merged in 1905 to form the British Red Cross Society (BRCS), with 
the king as patron, the queen as president, and Sir Frederick Treves, surgeon to the 
king and veteran of the South African conflict, as chairman of the executive com-
mittee, divisions continued to affect the organization of voluntary medical aid in 
Britain. Following the 1908 Haldane reforms to the military, the BRCS was asked to 
provide supplementary aid to the Territorial Medical Services, principally through 
the organization of county-based Voluntary Aid Detachments (VADs). However, the 
Admiralty and the War Office insisted that the St John and St Andrew Ambulance 
were also able to provide personnel trained under their own, separate, VAD scheme.20 
This exemption irritated the leadership of the BRCS, not helped by the fact that the 
two groups had very different ideas about the level of training needed to qualify as 
a VAD member. Thus ‘by 1914 many people had come to view the BRCS and the 
St John Ambulance Association as two separate bodies, which not only did not make 
17 N. Cantlie, A History of the Army Medical Department, Volume 2, (Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone, 1974).
18 Lord Scarborough, ‘Forward’ in N. Corbet Fletcher, The St. John Ambulance Association: Its History and its 
Part in the Ambulance Movement (London: The St John Ambulance Association, 1930), p. 3.
19 J. Clifford, A Good Uniform: The St. John Story (London: Robert Hale, 1967), p. 22.
20 Hutchinson, p. 250.
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common cause with one another but which were open rivals, not only over the VAD 
scheme but on a broader philanthropic front’.21
The British Red Cross in the First World War
Thus, despite the moves towards national unification, and the international 1906 
revision of the Geneva Conventions which recognized all national Red Cross societ-
ies as an integral part of their own army medical services in time of war,22 when war 
broke out in 1914, the established voluntary medical aid organizations in Britain were 
ill-prepared for a major European conflict. Not only were the BRCS and St John 
Ambulance in competition with each other, they were also poorly coordinated with 
the military medical services, a fact that was to have practical implications for medi-
cal care in the early months of the war.23 Arriving in Brussels on 19 August, Sir 
Alfred Keogh, Chief Commissioner to the BRCS overseas Commission found that 
three-quarters of the medical unit already sent out was unemployed. By 26 August 
he ‘was in Rouen telegraphing for ten cars for recumbent wounded and two small 
cars. Next day he was in Havre reporting unfavourably on the lack of bearers to deal 
with battle casualties.’24 Keogh set about coordinating with representatives from the 
St John Ambulance Association and placing ‘independent’ British voluntary aid par-
ties in France and Belgium under the direct authority of the Commission,25 while Lord 
Northcliffe announced that ‘he would refuse to publish in The Times or any other 
newspaper he owned advertisements from two separate societies appealing to the 
public for the same purpose’.26 An agreement for the two societies to work together 
as the Joint War Committee of the British Red Cross and the Order of St John of 
Jerusalem (hereafter referred to as the Joint Committee) was eventually arrived at on 
24 October, following the intervention of the king.
There continued, however, to be a lack of coordination with the military authorities, 
as seen in the initial confusion over rail evacuations, which saw the Adjutant-General, 
the Director General of Medical Services (DGMS), and the Red Cross Commissioner 
all issuing uncoordinated orders. Who precisely was responsible for this confused 
state of affairs remains a matter of some debate. Mark Harrison, for instance, has 
argued that the lack of coordination was due to the fact that ‘The Red Cross was 
rather jealous of its independence and resentful of War Office interference, if not of 
War Office funds’.27 By contrast, in its 1921 report on the activities of the British Red 
Cross during the war, the Joint Committee made a case for the AMS to take greater 
responsibility for an initial refusal to take up many of the early offers of assistance 
made by the BRCS, despite the fact that it found itself ‘at short notice, obliged to 
21 Ibid., p. 253
22 J. Clifford, For the Service of All Mankind: Furley, Lechmere and Duncan, St. John’s Ambulance Founders 
(London: Robert Hale, 1971), p. 180.
23 M. Harrison, The Medical War: British Military Medicine in the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), p. 19.
24 B. Oliver, The British Red Cross in Action (London: Faber & Faber, 1966), p. 227.
25 Harrison, p. 50.
26 Moorehead, p. 210
27 Harrison, p. 42.
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organize on a scale which makes efficient assistance offered to it from outside not 
only welcome, but at times a necessity’.28 It was only, Caroline Moorehead argues, 
when Viscount Esher, chairman of the Territorial Forces Association of the County of 
London, returned from inspecting the front, and confronted Lord Kitchener with the 
reality of lack of resources available to the AMS, that a working partnership began 
to be established. Even then, ‘During the early years of the war, various sections of 
the British military medical services remained sniffy about the Red Cross, preferring 
to ignore its growing numbers of experienced surgeons and nurses, and dismissing 
its admirably run stores and depots as no more than little luxuries’.29 As Geoffrey 
Winthrop Young recalled of the early days of the FAU, which was authorized by the 
BRCS:
the RAMC would have none of our aid. […] It was a feature of that war […] that when 
once battles began, all medical provision or supply of ambulances was found hopelessly 
inadequate for the countless wounded. Our volunteer help was then accepted and claimed 
and even clamoured for, so long as battle continued. But no sooner had the fighting died 
down than our emergency presence became an offence. It reflected upon the foresight 
of the senior officers responsible for the regular provision […]. We were then abruptly 
disclaimed, and an attempt made to shuffle us back out of sight.30
How, then, was the BRCS and its dependent units eventually able to work with the 
British Army in France and Belgium, to meet ‘the constantly growing demand of 
the Army, not only on the traditional Red Cross lines of supplementing the work 
of the RAMC in the care of the sick and wounded, but also in the many new direc-
tions which experience suggested, the most notable of which was the transport of 
the wounded’?31 This was achieved, principally, through the ever-closer integration 
of the Joint Committee with the medical military services and, by extension, with the 
military’s priorities and the national war effort. At one level, this involved the simple 
military takeover of the aspects of the evacuation, as in the case of hospital trains, 
where, ‘By the end of 1914, all matters concerning the fitting and running of hospi-
tal trains came under a new Advisory Committee, which consisted entirely of Army 
officers, with the addition of a single French railway officer’.32 Conversely, there 
was also devolution of some authority by the military to the BRCS, which eventually 
supplied ten fully administered war hospitals and three complete ambulance units.33 
Actual partnership is clearest, however, in the policy shifts relating to BRCS recruit-
ment as manpower shortages worsened. As the Report of the Joint Committee noted, 
‘In 1915, at the request of the War Office, we ceased to send out men under forty 
who were fit for the Army, and on the passing of the Military Service Act the War 
28 Reports by the Joint War Committee and the Joint War Finance Committee of the British Red Cross and the 
Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England on Voluntary Aid Rendered to the Sick and Wounded at Home and 
Abroad and to British Prisoners of War, 1914–1919, with Appendices (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
1921), p. 3.
29 Moorehead, p. 220.
30 Winthrop Young, pp. 185–86.
31 Reports by the Joint War Committee, p. 227.
32 Harrison, p. 42.
33 Reports by the Joint Committee, p. 350.
112 JESSICA MEyER
Office allowed us to engage only men of low category’.34 Such changes in recruit-
ment reflect the extent to which voluntary medical aid, like other forms of British 
voluntary aid in the First World War, was increasingly coming within the remit of 
state intervention.35
The Report by the Joint War Committees would claim in 1921 that ‘Undoubtedly 
the chief factor in our usefulness was the confidence with which from the beginning 
they were able to inspire the military authorities and the cordial relations which 
always existed between the Red Cross, the [Royal Army Medical Corps] RAMC and 
the [Royal Army Service Corps] RASC, without which our work would have been 
impossible’.36 While not all adaptations were as smooth as this assurance might indi-
cate, by the end of the war, the work of the BRCS and its associated units was closely 
integrated with that of the military on a variety of levels, including the provision of 
nursing, the supply of medical materiel, and the running of evacuation transport. 
The only way in which the British Red Cross could achieve the success it ultimately 
did was by allying itself directly with the aims of the military body authorizing its 
activities. It was during the war, then, that the BRCS fully embraced ‘Red Cross 
patriotism’, the prioritizing of cooperation and identification with national war aims 
and effort in the provision of medical aid. In doing so, the organization reinforced 
wartime cultural narratives which defined appropriate voluntary service, almost 
exclusively, as that offered to one’s nation and those who defended its interests.
The Friends’ Ambulance Unit
While the increased coordination between the BRCS and the AMS, at the administra-
tive level, demonstrates the role of the First World War in defining the parameters of 
medical voluntarism, it also had a more ambiguous impact, as this definition struck at 
the roots of the ideological aims of medical relief as an international act of humani-
tarianism in wartime.37 Nowhere is this better illustrated than by the conflict that the 
increasing cooperation between voluntary medical aid and the British state caused 
for the FAU, as a unit officially authorized by the BRCS but with strong ties to the 
Society of Friends, whose pacifist principles many members shared. Formed in 1914, 
with the initial intention of providing relief to Serbia, the Unit first went into service, 
with the authority of the BRCS, under the title of the ‘Anglo-Belgian Ambulance 
Unit’. The name was changed in early 1915. According to Geoffrey Winthrop Young, 
a founder member of the unit, the new name was chosen because ‘Two of our officers 
were Quakers by birth, while three were not; but we were all personal friends’.38
This description is slightly disingenuous. While the unit was never entirely made 
up of Quaker members, the bulk of its funding in the early days did come from the 
British Society of Friends, and fund-raising was led by Sir George Newman, Chief 
Medical Officer to the Board of Education and the editor of the Society’s journal, 
34 Reports by the Joint Committee , p. 94.
35 Grant, p. 46.
36 Reports by the Joint Committees, p. 278.
37 For a discussion of the ideological underpinnings of the International Committee of the Red Cross, see 
Moorhead, pp. 28–29.
38 WinthropYoung, p. 188.
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The Friend. The original appeal for volunteers had appeared in The Friend on 21 
August 1914, and the Meeting for Sufferings, the representative body of the Society, 
‘was inevitably drawn in by many appeals for guidance’. However, the scheme ‘was 
never laid before the Meeting in the same way as […] other proposals’,39 such as 
those for relief committees, including the Emergency Committee for the Assistance of 
Germans, Austrians, Hungarians and Turks in Distress and the War Victims’ Relief 
Committee. Indeed, for some Friends, the use of the word ‘Friends’ in the unit’s title 
was viewed as objectionable, although such an objection was ‘hard to sustain since, 
by Quaker custom, the title had been allowed for almost a century to bodies which 
drew their officers and most of their members from the Society’.40 After the war, the 
FAU claimed that seventy per cent of its members, of whom there were approximately 
1800 over the course of the conflict, were Quakers, although this was not a constant 
proportion throughout.
The relationship of the unit with the BRCS, and through it, to the British military 
and national war aims, dates from early on in the war. On 26 October 1914, Philip 
Baker (later Philip Noel Baker) and Geoffrey Winthrop Young met with Sir Arthur 
Stanley, the Chairman of the Joint War Committee: ‘They asked his acceptance of 
the Unit under the auspices of the Joint War Committee, and his help in providing 
ambulances and equipment to enable them to set off for Belgium at the earliest pos-
sible moment. Both were readily granted, and it was arranged that they should leave 
London on October 30th’.41 The manpower of the unit came from a group recruited 
by Baker, mainly from fellow Cambridge undergraduates, who had undertaken unof-
ficial training at Jordans, a hamlet in Buckinghamshire with strong Quaker roots, 
with the original intention of providing aid to Serbia. This plan had been abandoned 
when Serbia had appeared to have been ‘knocked out of the war’, and the unit had 
been disbanded. In October, therefore, the unit’s leaders were faced with the ques-
tion, ‘Could it be reassembled at once? [They] were certain it could. Messages flew 
over the country. Forty men and some eight ambulances were collected and driven 
rapidly down to the coast. […] On the second day after my return we were already 
embarked and on our way to Dunkirk’.42
Young’s recollections, as might be expected of those of a former journalist, are 
full of energy and vividly convey youthful enthusiasm. What is notable about all the 
recollections of the formation of the unit and, indeed, its first year and a half of ser-
vice, however, is the consistency of this enthusiasm of recollection. Meaburn Tatham 
and James Miles, in their official history of the unit, describes ‘the Unit setting out, 
almost in knight-errant fashion, to look for work wherever it thought such might be 
found’.43 This echoes the language used by Sir George Newman in the book’s intro-
duction where he talks of ‘A band of English Quaker youths [who] […] could not by 
39 J. Ormerod Greenwood, Quaker Encounters: Volume 1: Friends and Relief (York: William Sessions Limited, 
1975), p. 181. Greenwood traces the history of Quaker involvement with humanitarian relief back as far as the 
sixteenth century.
40 Ormerod Greenwood, p. 182.
41 M. Tatham and J. E. Miles, eds., The Friends’ Ambulance Unit 1914–1919: A Record (London: The Swarthmore 
Press Ltd., 1919), p. 4.
42 Winthrop Young, pp. 182–83.
43 Tatham and Miles, p. 8.
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their religious bonds join the Colours; nor, by the same bonds, could they return to 
college or calling. So they set forth on a quest of chivalry — a quest which became 
a conquest — the service of healing and “the care of him who shall have borne 
battle”’.44 He goes on to explain the reasons for such enthusiasm:
I think there were three motives. First, they were not content to remain passive with 
folded hands in the midst of the conflict, because of their religious views, upbringing, or 
conscientious objection to war. Secondly, they desired to stand beside their companions 
and friends who went to fight, and share their dangers, their self-renunciation, devotion 
and sacrifice. Thirdly, they were impressed with the inadequacy of the means and agen-
cies then existing for dealing with the miseries and desolations of war, particularly in the 
invaded portions of Belgium.45
The result he described as ‘a record of the adventure and chivalry of Youth […] 
a harvest of splendid achievement’.46 The language is that of a heroism and ideal-
ized masculinity that comes directly from the pleasure culture of war, and the cult 
of reimagined chivalry, that so saturated British middle- and upper-class culture 
in the decades preceding the First World War.47 It is the language of knights and 
adventure, translated from conquest and conflict into the realm of medical aid and 
succour.
Such a use of language allowed young men, whose religious convictions set them 
against militarism and warfare, to lay claim to a share of the ethos of service in war-
time, an ethos that was key to ideals of appropriate masculine identity.48 Just as the 
BRCS sought to identify its cooperation with, and help to, the AMS and the British 
war effort as a key achievement during the war, so too did members of the FAU, and 
its sponsors, seek to justify their individual roles through the retrospective construc-
tion of their actions as those of chivalric aid. Such a position allowed them to garner 
cultural approbation and status for actions that might otherwise have condemned 
them in a wartime culture which gave primacy to combatant service.49 Significantly 
though, for the FAU, war service, and the adventure that might accompany it, was 
always to be voluntary, and always for the relief of the suffering individual, rather 
than the nation. In this way, the FAU was, at least initially, able to position itself in 
relation to both the Red Cross patriotism of the BRCS, and the humanitarian pacifist 
traditions of the Meeting of Sufferings, in a way that could be acknowledged as valid, 
if not fully accepted by both these institutions.
44 G. Newman, ‘Introduction’ in Tatham and Miles, vii.
45 Newman, vii–viii.
46 Newman, vii.
47 Graham Dawson argues that ‘Images and stories about military war […] clearly provided pleasure and excite-
ment for very large numbers of men and boys, to the extent that it seemed feasible to speak of a popular 
masculine pleasure-culture of war.’ (Dawson, p. 4) For discussions of the popular representation of this culture 
in relation to the First World War in particular, see Paris, chapter 4. On the nineteenth century cult of chivalry, 
see Mark Girouard, The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1981).
48 M. Roper, The Secret Battle: Emotional Survival in the Great War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2009), pp. 167–70, 178–80.
49 Bibbings, p. 89.
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Yet the conflict between, on the one hand, their desire for a form of war service, 
and the cultural approbation such service would bring, and, on the other, the prin-
ciples of Quaker pacifism, could not be eliminated by the gloss of chivalry which 
clothed the desire of a group of young men to engage with what they perceived 
as the great adventure of their lifetime in romantic language. An equally powerful 
motivation for the founder members was that of service to the suffering, a motivation 
had its roots in the pre-war Quaker organizations, the ‘Friends Christian Fellowship 
Union’ (male) and the ‘Friends Fellowship of Service’ (female), which combined to 
form the ‘Young Friends Group’ by 1911. All three groups had a missionary tenor, 
aiming to engage young Quakers in their religion through active service for the alle-
viation of suffering, whether in peace or war. Indeed, Margaret Hirst argued that the 
Ambulance Unit was a direct result of the activities and ideas promoted by the Young 
Friends Group, arising as it did ‘from the desire of many young men to serve in the 
war zone, where their countrymen were in hourly danger’.50
At the same time as the Young Friends Group was mobilizing young Quakers 
for service, however, many of these same young Quakers were taking a more vocal 
stance in defence of the Friends’ tradition of pacifism. In 1911, at the Swanwick 
Conference, John Percy Fletcher and Alfred Barrett Brown had emerged as two of the 
best known and most respected young Friends for the debate they initiated over ‘con-
cern at the use of military force’ against striking railwaymen. Although their motion 
was defeated, it nonetheless precipitated a clear declaration of pacifist principles on 
the part of the majority of those present. When John William Graham argued in 
debate that ‘Force […] would always be necessary in dealing with savages, luna-
tics, children and strikers […] [t]he reaction was vociferous; “Speaker after speaker 
voiced the hope that he would hold to his convictions to the uttermost. Both men 
and women repudiated his suggestion that any many should lose his soul by doing 
the killing for their sakes”’.51 Nor did the outbreak of war significantly affect these 
principles. At the Yearly Meeting in 1915, the first following the outbreak of the war 
‘it became clear that the Society would remain pacifist — more and more emphati-
cally so as time went on’.52
Yet even as the Meeting was declaring its pacifism, ‘some Friends were recruiting, 
and 250 young men who were members of the Society had voluntarily enlisted; by 
the end of the war 560 out of the 1,666 noted as eligible for military service were in 
the armed forces’.53 Indeed, the position of the Meeting was never intended to be, or 
viewed by Friends as, binding on the conscience of individuals. Rather:
Each young [male] Quaker had personal decisions to make; and from the first there 
was a whole spectrum of choice before him. He might volunteer as a soldier, or join the 
non-combatant service in the Forces, or work in ancillary bodies such as the Red Cross 
or the Y.M.C.A. […] [H]e might volunteer for one of the non-Quaker relief bodies such 
as the Belgian or Serbian Relief Funds. He might apply to the Friends Ambulance Unit; 
50 M. E. Hirst, The Quakers in Peace and War: An Account of Their Peace Principles and Practice (London: The 
Swarthmore Press, 1923), p. 501.
51 Ormerod Greenwood, pp.176–77.
52 Ibid., p. 179.
53 Ibid., p. 178.
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or prepare, as conscription grew near, for alternative service on the land, in forestry or 
in a hospital. He might offer to go to France or Holland, or later, to Poland or Russia, 
for the Friends War Victims Relief Committee; or he might stay at home and work for 
the Emergency Committee set up for the relief of distressed enemy aliens in Britain. He 
might refuse to acknowledge the authority of the state and prepare for a series of prison 
sentences, or even (at one stage) the distinct possibility of being shot as a traitor.54
Thus the FAU’s position in relation to the Society of Friends was ambiguous from its 
very inception. While deeply imbued with Quaker principles of service to the suffer-
ing of others, which also animated the war relief campaigns, and eager to avoid overt 
militarism through its use of the language of romantic chivalry, the unit was not an 
official body of the Society. It was also, as we have seen, implicated in the nation’s 
military endeavours, and those of its allies, from the outset. Nonetheless, it continued 
to raise money via the Society, publicize its doings in the Friend and, above all, use 
the title which established a close association in the mind of the public. for whom ‘a 
Friends Ambulance Unit was the Ambulance Unit of the Society of Friends’.55
The ambiguity of the unit’s status in relation to the Society was relatively unprob-
lematic in the early years of the war, although it is clear that some members found 
the fact that the unit was so closely allied with the war effort, through its answering 
formally to the BRCS, difficult to square with Quaker pacifist beliefs.56 It was the 
introduction of conscription in 1916, however, which brought the problem of the 
unit’s ideological position into sharp focus:
During the passing of the Military Service Act four leaders of the Friends Ambulance Unit 
had been called into consultation by the War Office, and asked to collaborate in arrang-
ing work of “national importance” for members of the Society coming under the Act; 
so that all Quakers coming before the tribunals to be set up for conscientious objectors 
could be referred to the Friends Ambulance Unit. By entering into these negotiations and 
agreeing to such a scheme, the Unit were putting themselves in a doubly false position; 
for they were not an official Quaker body, and they had no authority to represent the 
Society of Friends, which had repeatedly and emphatically declared that it would accept 
no special arrangements or privileges for its members. In March, 1916, the Friends Service 
Committee was driven to disown the Friends Ambulance Unit, and a period of intense 
suspicion and bitterness followed. This was deepened […] by the conduct of the Friends 
Ambulance Unit itself. It advertised its willingness to help the government, and allowed 
its principal field officers — who by this time were not Quakers — to accept honorary 
commissions in the Army to facilitate their work.57
The stance taken by the FAU leadership was thus consistent with that of the BRCS, in 
its policy of refusing to employ men otherwise eligible for military service. It conflicted, 
however, with the pacifist principles of many Quakers, who believed that not only 
engaging in conflict themselves, but also acting in ways that forced others to engage in 
conflict, was morally wrong. Although the Military Services Act contained a ‘conscience 
54 Ibid., pp. 178–79.
55 Ibid., p. 182.
56 Ibid., p. 182.
57 Ibid., pp. 183–84.
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clause’, the only one of its kind among the European nations engaged in the conflict,58 
which provided for exemption from military service to be granted on application to a 
tribunal system, the support for conscription implied by the FAU’s agreement was a step 
too far for those who set their faces firmly against military compulsion of any sort.59
The result of this agreement between the officers of the FAU and the War Office 
was a formalization of the status of the unit as a legitimate and expected space for 
service for those with conscientious objections to combatant service.60 The conscience 
clause covered motivations that included political convictions, as well as a wide 
variety of religious groups, whose beliefs about what level of wartime service was 
unconscionable for an individual were extremely variable. Thus some would com-
mit to service providing aid for suffering servicemen, some would contribute to war 
work as long as it did not involve actually taking up arms, and some, of whom 958 
are recorded, were so-called absolutists, who refused to undertake any form of war 
work that might assist the continuation of the conflict in any way. Although part of 
the agreement between the FAU and the War Office included the exemption of men 
already serving in the FAU from conscription, a number of the unit’s members were 
in this last group of objectors. For them, objection to conscription entailed resigning 
from the service of the FAU and resisting the call up to combatant service that fol-
lowed. The resignation of these men, including Corder Catchpool, one of the founder 
members and later Adjutant of the unit, stretched the actual connection with the 
Society of Friends even thinner. It also opened up, once again, the question of the 
meaning of voluntary medical service as a philanthropic act in wartime.
Corder Catchpool
Corder Catchpool is an interesting case study, because his path through the war most 
clearly exemplifies the complexities of the Quaker stance on service in wartime, and 
the problems that voluntary medical service in particular could pose. A school friend 
of Philip Baker, Catchpool was one of the earliest recruits to the unit and, ‘early in 
November 1914, he donned the khaki uniform of the FAU, and marched with his 
comrades through London streets to Charing Cross, bound for France, and chant-
ing the inevitable “Tipperary”’.61 Once arrived at Dunkirk, as he wrote in a letter 
home, ‘they asked immediately for volunteer dressers; hundreds of wounded at the 
station, and no one to attend them. I am not rated as a dresser, but was mad to go — 
and went — got round a Doctor somehow — I believe I was almost irresistible just 
then’.62 Whatever his views on conflict, Catchpool’s appetite for adventure and expe-
rience was strong in the early years of the war.
58 Bibbings, p. 29; A. Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 91.
59 This stance on conscription predated 1916. When a form of conscription was introduced in Australia, between 
1905 and 1909, in response to the perceived threat of Japan in the region, ‘Friends from Great Britain went out 
to give counsel and encouragement to the small and scattered groups of Quakers and their companions in 
conscientious objection. It was during this campaign that many stalwarts of Quaker war-time activities first 
[…] “smelt powder”.’ (Ormerod Greenwood, p. 167).
60 Bibbings, p. 208.
61 W. R. Hughes, Indomitable Friend: Corder Catchpool 1883–1952 (London: Housmans, 1956), p. 23.
62 T. C. Catchpool, On Two Fronts (London: Headly Bros. Publishers, Ltd., 1918), p. 21.
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For six months Catchpool worked tirelessly as part of the FAU, providing both 
military and, increasingly, as the RAMC became better organized and deployed more 
men, civilian relief in Belgium and Flanders. According to his biographer William 
Hughes, he ‘found tremendous satisfaction in being able to give himself so com-
pletely to this work’.63 By midsummer 1915, he had been made Adjutant of the unit, 
and found himself dealing largely with office work. By November, he was writing, 
‘I am getting soul-sick of the work out here the last four months, mending motor-cars 
instead of men’. In December he complained, ‘I should be more content as a hospital 
orderly than doing the work I have had to do. Often I have gone about my work all 
day with a pathetic longing to find someone to be kind to, gentle and loving with. I 
have felt the funds of sympathy in me drying up for want of exercise’.64 As an adven-
ture, the war was proving as disillusioning to a man who approached it in a spirit of 
service as to those who entered into it with dreams of glory.
At the same time that Catchpool was losing his enthusiasm for the type of work 
he was doing with the FAU, the status of the unit, as a voluntary service unit of 
those opposed to conflict, was being called into question by the British government’s 
ever-increasing demands for manpower. Despite the ‘conscience clause’, the intro-
duction of conscription posed a very real problem for pacifists of conscience such 
as Catchpool, who were working in roles that might be seen as supporting the war 
effort indirectly. In total war, those civilian and voluntary occupations, to which con-
firmed conscientious objectors might be assigned by a military service tribunal, could 
be seen as aiding the war effort, either through the provision of materiel or through 
the freeing-up of the labour of men, who were then conscripted into the combatant 
forces. Both of these facts were problematic for a number of members of the FAU. 
Catchpool described the ideological challenges that conscription posed in a statement 
made before his second court martial:
[T]he medical service had been completely reorganised. Voluntary units were either dis-
pensed with, or practically absorbed into the regular armies. The wounded no longer 
lacked help, and the R.A.M.C. was often closed to applicants. Men displaced from the 
service taken over by the Unit …were often drafted into the firing line and complained 
bitterly that I and my comrades had sent them there. […] The primary object of our work 
was the refitting of men to take their places again in the trenches.65
It was this last objection, rather than the narrowing options for providing war-
time medical service outside of the official military structure, which appear to have 
prompted Catchpool to become one of the 142 so-called ‘absolutist’ conscientious 
objectors associated with the Society of Friends who refused to engage with the war 
effort in any way. The man who had marched off to war as a volunteer in 1914 in 
a khaki uniform was imprisoned in 1917 for refusing to obey a military order as a 
conscripted soldier to put on a soldier’s uniform.
63 Hughes, p. 28.
64 Catchpool, pp. 30–31.
65 Corder Catchpool quoted in Ormerod Greenwood, Quaker Encounters, p. 183. This statement was included 
in the pamphlet ‘I Appeal Unto Caesar: The Case of the Conscientious Objector’, which caused a sensation 
when it was published by Allen & Unwin in 1916. I am grateful to Dr Jane Potter for drawing this controversy 
to my attention.
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Despite the resignation of Catchpool and others, the link with the Society was 
maintained, once again through the concept of service. On 19 May 1916, Newman, 
as editor of The Friend, wrote, ‘We are not willing, though differing in method, to 
be pitted against each other. We decline to be divided. Some Friends undertake one 
form of service and some another, each according to his conscience, but all forms of 
true service spring from a common source, and may be inspired by one and the same 
spirit’.66 The work of the unit continued, reinforced by non-absolutist (and often 
non-Quaker) conscientious objectors such as D. J. Bolton, a Non-Conformist who 
actively sought service with the FAU as an alternative to either military service or 
prison.67 However, after the second battle of Ypres, as Catchpool had observed, the 
work of the unit shifted substantially from front-line medical care, now undertaken 
by military medical units, to work such as the staffing of ambulance trains. This was 
particularly monotonous, uncomfortable, and labour-intensive work, and Tatham 
and Miles noted in their official history that the Unit
would have preferred employment which, if not in essence more useful, would bring 
its work nearer to the actual fighting line. In all sincerity it may be said that the Unit 
never wished to avoid the more acute hardships and dangers of the campaign by taking 
advantage of its members’ exemption from military service. For any unenlisted Red Cross 
body, and especially perhaps the FAU, the situation was almost inevitable, but, though 
the official point of view was realised, there were many members who felt acutely the 
meagreness of their share of sacrifice.68
In the midst of the war, the service and sacrifice that medical voluntarism outside of 
the military effort offered could not compete with that of the enlisted serviceman, a 
figure increasingly associated with ideals of Christian sacrifice and suffering as the 
war continued.69 Service was no longer enough to give status to the work of medical 
voluntarism as appropriate work for men in wartime.
Conclusion
The histories of both the BRCS and the FAU during the First World War, therefore, 
demonstrate the validity of Grant’s argument that medical voluntary services came 
under state control with relative rapidity. As has been argued here, however, the 
ever-closer identification of voluntary medical care with the aims and priorities of the 
nation at war was not uncontested. For the members of the FAU, in particular, such 
contestation was to last throughout the war, leading to some members renouncing 
their positions in the unit to become absolutist conscientious objectors, while sections 
of the unit resisted the restrictions of supporting the British war effort by offering 
their services to other allied nations, including France and Italy.
66 George Newman, quoted in Hirst, p. 510.
67 Papers of D. J. Bolton, CO 010, Liddle Collection, Special Collections, University of Leeds.
68 Tatham and Miles, p. 134.
69 Such enlisted men included members of the RAMC, particularly the stretcher bearers whose endurance under 
fire was the subject of much praise. The spirituality of the suffering of the stretcher bearer was often made 
explicit, for example in the poem ‘To Stretcher Bearers’ by Geoffrey Anketell Studdert Kennedy, better known 
as ‘Woodbine Willie’.
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This continuing contestation highlights the limits of ‘Red Cross patriotism’ as a 
social motivator for male volunteers, even in the midst of total war. Throughout the 
war, the BRCS appealed to the public’s desire to assist their own soldiers, and those 
of their allies, as reflected in their post-war report of their activities and relationship 
with the British military. Nonetheless, the Committee attempted to retain a sense of 
its own identity, expressed through its comparison of the efficiency of its provision, 
of both personnel and materiel, with that of the AMS. The voluntarist ethos of medi-
cal care-giving could thus be valorized as a form of service, as much as that of the 
combat volunteer. The prioritization of ideals of service is even clearer in the case of 
the FAU, where such service could form a compromise between a desire for adventure 
and principles of conscience. The introduction of conscription, however, created a 
complicating factor that placed a question mark over the meaning of medical volun-
tarism within a framework of military compulsion. In this context the willingness to 
serve in a strictly humanitarian capacity was no longer enough. Both the BRCS and 
the FAU were forced to compromise the definition of their roles as voluntary medi-
cal organizations separate from the work and aims of the military medical services.
Yet the work of both the BRCS and the FAU also complicates any simple nar-
rative of a move from independence to partnership with state welfare systems. In 
their post-war self-constructions, seen in publications such as the Report of the Joint 
Committees and Tatham and Miles’ official history, both organizations laid claim to 
a role which was based on an understanding of medical voluntarism as a distinct form 
of wartime service. While they demonstrated the ability of voluntary groups to work 
with the state to achieve its ends, an understanding of the independence of medi-
cal care-giving as a purely humanitarian service, voiced through both institutional 
and individual contestation, remained. This desire for a dual definition of voluntary 
medical service in wartime continues to shape the contested understanding of non-
governmental medical care providers in war zones to this day.
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